The authors identify several types of the new forms of protestmovement that are discusses within the problems of autonomy ofscientific system and the protection of the interests of scientists. They argue that the this type of communication shows how it is possible to combine both cognitive and normative attitude of science. The authors show the mechanisms of the reproduction of this communication and argue that it gradually turns into communicative macro system. The authors conclude that the protest movement in science (...) could be considered as a practical resolution of the Merton – Popper paradox, which presumes the incompatibility of both cognitive attitude (impartial observation) and normative dimension (value production) of science. (shrink)

The article shows that Kuhn's concept of incommensurability emphasizes mainly the objective dimension of communication. To the thesis about the incommensurability of the meanings of scientific concepts in competing paradigms, we oppose the idea of a three-dimensional space of communicative dimensions. We supplement the objective dimension of communication, within which the environmental evolutionary selection of the best knowledge is carried out, with equal social and temporal horizons.

The article raises the problem of the ambiguity and polysemantic nature of the complex and heterogeneous semantics of the concept of science. This concept includes theories and methods, models and classifications of reality, scientific laws and laws of nature, scientific thinking, scientific publications, experiments and laboratory activities, scientific institutes and research teams, scientific research, expertise and scientific disciplines, scientific knowledge and scientific truth, etc. Nevertheless, with all the abovementioned complexity, science exhibits the properties of a single, dynamically developing complex phenomenon (...) and, accordingly, requires an appropriate interdisciplinary, complex definition that is sensitive to its fundamental contexts: thematic, social and temporal. (shrink)

In the first part of the article, the author substantiates the importance of philosophical communication as a kind of dependent variable that does not have an independent meaning without pointing to something else through which the philosophy itself (often negatively and non-reflectively) defines. We are talking about global centers of “systemic” communication (politics, science, religion, etc.), imposing their observations on other communities. It is argued that the priority of philosophical communication is justified by the ability to carry out “universal observations”, (...) which is deprived of all other communication systems.In the second part of the article, the methodological question is first solved about the possibility of explaining a number of phenomena (communications, observations), for which no indication of external factors justifying their existence is required. It is proved that the description and explanation of such phenomena is possible on the way of formulating “significant tautologies” (Peter Railton). Using this method, the author carries out a meaningful deployment of the significant tautology “philosophy is only philosophy” and substantiates that philosophy is communication, capable of defining itself in a universal way: through something else and through itself. The author concludes that philosophy can be considered as a communicative system (i.e.,observer), whose mission is to generate a unique product: a universal self-description of modern society, where philosophy combines three fundamental observational abilities: scientific, protest and artistic activity. (shrink)

The author considers the evolutionary approach to the development of the scientific knowledge in framework of the Niklas Luhmann's system-communicative theory and presents a thesis that in respect to the final evolutional state (state of stabilization of new form of knowledge) the organization of the Russian science has not yet achieved the world-level of sufficient autonomy because there was not yet been established the self-substitutive order of the knowledge accumulation which is inherent to the autopoiesis of the contemporary science i.e. (...) the process of continued change of some ones truths by some others. The factors impeding to establish such a self-substitutive order are to be connected by the author with the impact on the scientific discourse from some external communicative forms (the theological, financial, economical, political ones) and with the continuous change of some selective criterions that have to define what has to be accumulated as a memory of the science as a communicative system. (shrink)

The article raises the problem of functionality and rational explanation of large arrays of communicative and unclaimed scientific knowledge. To solve the problem and explain this phenomenon, the resources of the system-communicative theory of scientific communication and social-evolutionist approaches are involved. The ability of the system-communicative theory itself to explain this phenomenon is considered as a possibility of its verification. In conclusion, a working hypothesis is proposed linking the existence of a class of unclaimed research and researchers with the function (...) of meta-observation: through their online network reactions on appropriate electronic platforms (downloads, citations, readings, reviews, recommendations, etc.), the distribution of scientific reputations of science leaders and selection of the best scientific knowledge is ensured. This function, according to the author, compensates for the lack of an external audience or public capable of understanding and adequately evaluating scientific achievements in the scientific communication system. It is concluded that the past “collegial and deliberative” assessment of scientific achievements, the appropriate distribution of reputations and support for research projects is incompatible with the dynamic conditions of the “publication market”. (shrink)

The article focuses on the role of social technology in the Russian electoral process. On this basis, the author provides answers to more general issues concerning such questions as whether it is possible in the Russian context to combine social stability and informative political communication; whether a conflict-free processing of objective information can be achieved; whether political communication can extricate itself from self-referential isolation around the issue of social unity and address the real challenges facing society; and whether the authorities (...) will be able to transition from motivative-integrative social technologies to object-information technologies. (shrink)

The article is devoted to social problems of modern science (as it were interpreted Max Weber) considered in the context of the system-communicative approach by N. Luhmann. In contrast to the modern work of art, the modern science, as M. Weber believes, is associated with the fundamental unattainability of “true being”, and, as a result, with the transitory character of any scientific achievement. The specialty of modern science, as Weber noted, is determinated, on the one hand by its self-understanding, due (...) to the “peculiarity of the current moment”, and, on the other, by its transformation into a kind of blind spot of scientific observation. As a result, Weber formulated the main problem of the meaning of modern science: he wondered why any scientist needs a science under (1) external alienation and (2) inaccessibility of a scientific object? Moreover, the category of truth not just acquires its special value, but also sets a special meaning to the purpose of scientific communication, that becomes an object but not a property of scientific search. The main content of the article is the study of the Weberian concepts of the external (science as a profession) and internal (science as vocation) social factors of modern science as they were interpreted by E. von Kahler, G. Rickert, M. Scheller, K. Loewit. The authors discuss their attempts to modernize the fundamental Weberian distinction of truth/value as a principle of inclusion in the scientific community, that was formulated as a response to the “Weber’s challenge”. The authors argue that von Kahler criticized the Weberian concept for the incompatibility of the spatial and temporal discreteness of science within the “organic understanding” of the unity of the world. At the same time Scheler and Rickert payed special attention to the problem of subject specification of science. K. Levit discussed the possibility of Weber’s substitution of objectivity as a key distinction of modern knowledge with some opposite attribute. In the final part, the authors summarize the inconsistency of predictions about the further internal differentiation of scientific disciplines and the rejection of research motive for “genuine being”. (shrink)

This article is dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the publication of Niklas Luhmann’s book The Science of Society. The system-communicative approach to the analysis of science is reconstructed with a focus on the relation of science to its highly complex external world. The problem of complexity is posed as a key one and is considered in the context of the communicative “reduction of the complexity” of the external world, which science actualizes through its unique binary opposition (truth/falsehood distinction). The (...) complexity of the world that science is facing disintegrates into two large areas. On the one hand, science processes its own external world, i.e., nature, society, the human psyche, as its object and thus fulfills a unique function, the pursuance of research. Scientific communication in this case can be integrated in the form of transdisciplinary studies. On the other hand, science has to respond to the complexity of the internal (i.e., social) external world of the communicative system of science, namely, to interfaced communicative systems of the embracing system of world society (politics, economy, religion, education, law, etc.). In the latter case, science does not fulfill a function but delivers achievements on request to the above-mentioned communicative systems in exchange for resources for interdisciplinary studies, which are occasional and cannot serve for integrating scientific communication on a systematic basis. We will propose some corrections to this theory and apply it to the situation in Russian science. (shrink)

The author analyses the problem of the communication from the epistemological point of view, noting that the interest to the theme is obviously determined by the enormous ambiguity and by the disciplinary vagueness of the communication's notion itself. It is argued that it is the philosophical conceptualization of the communication that allows in a certain sense to «save» philosophy itself. The author notes that the philosophical studies of communication as if return the relevance to the classical philosophical problems: to the (...) (communicative) sphere, (communicative) time, (social) causality, (collective) subject and object, filling them with the meaningful characteristics and testing their concepts by the experience of the functioning of real society and communication. He concludes that the epistemological content of the concept of communication is comes together with several aspects of human cognition. The first aspect has to do with the dimensions for defining the adequacy for determination of the statement made by the Other (i.e. the other participant), given that the content of the Other's consciousness is unavailable. The second aspect is related to the principle of a double purpose of any communication: on the one hand, integration and mutual understanding and, on the other, informational description of the subject of the message. The third aspect is that communication is based on the most important epistemological distinction between knowledge and ignorance, i.e. on the predominance of any information to one participant of the communication and of its uncertainty to the other participant, and that such a situation actually conditions the formation of communication systems, as well as of a wide variety of forms of sociality. The author also addresses the problem of whether contemporary media make communication at all possible since they decrease the impact that the secrecy of the Other's consciousness has on communication by triggering a communicative act. (shrink)

The article substantiates that science, thanks to the latest media in the dissemination of scientific communication (especially computer word processing, big data accumulation, mega-science installations, the latest international networking platforms and collaborations), has gone beyond all institutional, organizational, regional, national and partly disciplinary borders. Science as a supranational communication system has reached a complexity that is incompatible with the standards for evaluating scientific work and scientific achievements, which are traditionally carried out in the form of scientific committees, individual examinations and (...) other collegial forms of scientific communication. The collegiality of making the most important decisions regarding the examination of the scientific product itself, the thematic agenda, professional competencies and the resulting distribution of remuneration, reputation, ranks, degrees, grants has exhausted its capabilities to a certain extent. As a result, science turns out to be opaque both for the regulator, who is trying to exercise control over scientific institutions, and for science itself, which in the form of scientific self-government and philosophical reflection of science carries out the function of self-observation and self-description. A working hypothesis is proposed, which states that in response to this crisis of collegiality, reflection and control, new media of communicative success and new organizational forms of scientific communication crystallize in science, which can restore the ability of a scientific system to process its internal and external complexity. These media are represented by a new, social-networked form of scientific expertise and partly scientific work, which will be able to compensate for the lack of self-reflection, both at the organizational level of research institutes and at the level of global control over science as a whole. (shrink)

In this paper, the author analyzes and discusses the communicative approach used in the philosophy of science developed by N. Luhmann. He shows how Luhmann's communicative approach can be used to discuss a wide range "the classical problems" of knowledge: criteria for scientific knowledge, its autonomy and tools for achieving it, the problem of the foundation and structure of the scientific knowledge, the relationship between concepts and words, theories and methods.The author also analyzes the problem of the communication constraints imposed (...) on the process of systematic organization of science (i.e. the delimitation principle): the specificity and opportunity of the social theory, its differences and similarities with the settled classic examples of the theorizing; the peculiarities of the particular types of the scientific observation. (shrink)

The authors identify several types of the new forms of protestmovement that are discusses within the problems of autonomy ofscientific system and the protection of the interests of scientists. They argue that the this type of communication shows how it is possible to combine both cognitive and normative attitude of science. The authors show the mechanisms of the reproduction of this communication and argue that it gradually turns into communicative macro system. The authors conclude that the protest movement in science (...) could be considered as a practical resolution of the Merton – Popper paradox, which presumes the incompatibility of both cognitive attitude (impartial observation) and normative dimension (value production) of science. (shrink)

In the United States, patients have a clear right to determine what is done to them by doctors. Starting in the early 20th century, multiple court cases paved the way for our current understanding...

Unfortunately, there is broad confusion regarding the justification for healthcare professionals unilaterally limiting or withdrawing life-prolonging interventions. Many mistakenly believe that suc...

Volume 20, Issue 6, June 2020, Page 30-32.

Although the individual mandate was upheld and the Commerce Clause may have been cabined, the decision to strike down a significant element of the “Medicaid expansion” may prove to be the most significant aspect of the Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB v. Sebelius. Under the Affordable Care Act (ACA), States were required to extend Medicaid coverage to all individuals under the age of 65 with incomes below 133 percent of the poverty line, a new “essential health benefits” package was required (...) for all new Medicaid recipients, and the increased costs due to the expansion would be entirely covered by the Federal government through 2016, with the Federal payment gradually decreasing to a minimum of 90 percent of the total cost from the expanded coverage. The element found to be unconstitutional was §1396c of the ACA, which permitted the withdrawal of all Federal Medicaid funds from those States that did not comply with the ACA’s requirements for Medicaid expansion. The effect on access to health care may be significant: roughly half of those expected to gain coverage under the ACA were going to gain it through the Medicaid expansion; it is unclear how many States will choose to opt into that expansion in the absence of §1396c.1 Additionally, the argument offered by the Court to strike down that provision might be used to attack other federal programs—concerning transportation, social services, environmental protection, and others—that have a similar structure. This paper will demonstrate that the argument rests on a theoretical mistake concerning the relationships between coercion, compulsion, and political accountability and that, further, this mistake is not one legally forced upon the Court. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 11, Page 22-23, November 2011.

This article reviews the possible role of the universal basic income in the transformation of experience in gender and age perspectives. The universal basic income has been particularly hotly debated in recent decades. Regardless of the position, the common tone of the debates is the imperative “we must experiment.” Such a close interest in the universal basic income derives from the fact that it threatens to change the “generic” for humans situation of finiteness of resources and the need to work. (...) Thus, it is able to change the experience of what it means to be human. Since the universal basic income allows to separate labor from income, it is likely that its introduction will return value to the currently stigmatized or devalued types of labor, such as child care, elderly care or domestic work. It creates opportunities for experience redistribution in gender perspective: care and leaving, affective connection, and sensitivity could become the business of both parents, not just mothers. Another experience redistribution is possible in age perspective. Along with automation of labor, population ageing is a universal process that will sooner or later affect all the countries. Alarmist narratives that present this process as a threat and a problem now prevail. They are largely based on outdated ideas about old age and what it means to be old. However, in fact, ageing is the maturation of the population as a whole. With a proper re-evaluation of the meaning and significance of old age, the introduction of the universal basic income could create material conditions for the transfer of experience from the elderly to the younger – for the first time since traditional societies. (shrink)

(2010). Ethical Rules for Human Subjects Research: A Case Where the “Is” Must Inform the “Ought”. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 10, No. 6, pp. 14-15.

Throughout the 20th century, many doctors did not view pain management as an important aspect of their practice. Because pain cannot be objectively measured by the doctor, many doctors found it dif...

To figure out whether the main empirical question “Is our brain hardwired to believe in and produce God, or is our brain hardwired to perceive and experience God?” is answered, this paper presents systematic critical review of the positions, arguments and controversies of each side of the neuroscientific-theological debate and puts forward an integral view where the human is seen as a psycho-somatic entity consisting of the multiple levels and dimensions of human existence (physical, biological, psychological, and spiritual reality), allowing (...) consciousness/mind/spirit and brain/body/matter to be seen as different sides of the same phenomenon, neither reducible to each other. The emergence of a form of causation distinctive from physics where mental/conscious agency (a) is neither identical with nor reducible to brain processes and (b) does exert “downward” causal influence on brain plasticity and the various levels of brain functioning is discussed. This manuscript also discusses the role of cognitive processes in religious experience and outlines what can neuroscience offer for study of religious experience and what is the significance of this study for neuroscience, clinicians, theology and philosophy. A methodological shift from “explanation” to “description” of religious experience is suggested. This paper contributes to the ongoing discussion between theologians, cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists. (shrink)

There has long been tension between bioethicists whose work focuses on classical philosophical inquiry and those who perform empirical studies on bioethical issues. While many have argued that empirical research merely illuminates current practices and cannot inform normative ethics, others assert that research-based work has significant implications for refining our ethical norms. In this essay, I present a novel construct for classifying empirical research in bioethics into four hierarchical categories: Lay of the Land, Ideal Versus Reality, Improving Care, and Changing (...) Ethical Norms. Through explaining these four categories and providing examples of publications in each stratum, I define how empirical research informs normative ethics. I conclude by demonstrating how philosophical inquiry and empirical research can work cooperatively to further normative ethics. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 3, March 2020, Page 19-21.

Leech et al.'s analysis adds to an emerging consensus of the role of priming in analogy-making. However, their model cannot scale up to adult-level performance because not all relations can be cast as functions. One-size-fits-all accounts cannot capture the richness of analogy. Proportional analogies and transitive inferences can be made by nonstructural mechanisms. Therefore, these tasks do not generalize to tasks that require structure mapping.

Shocking. There seems no other response to the Fox findings. The bioethics community has been working for decades to improve the quality of, and access to, competent healthcare ethics consultation....

Mandelstam’s criticism of the Rayleigh theory of the blue color of the sky (1907) and his polemic with M. Planck (1907–1908) did not become notable events in the history of physics. However, the method of their coverage in the Soviet and in the post-Soviet physics literature is remarkable. Most of Soviet physicists and historians of physics supported Mandelstam's point of view in his criticism of both Raleigh and Planck. The situation changed only at the beginning of the 21st century: in (...) the Russian literature the publications appeared emphasizing that in the Raleigh–Mandelstam and Planck–Mandelstam controversies Mandelstam was not right, Raleigh and Planck were closer to the truth. Which presumptions of this trend can be noted? This was patriotism of the scientific school peculiar to Mandelstam’s graduate students and the former graduate students, the patriotism connected with solidarity which helped Mandelstam’s community to survive in the Soviet totalitarian regime and in the totalitarian organization of science. This was also progressionism which was popular among academics and among men in the street. The phenomenon of common knowledge, mutual knowledge among the members of a scientific community should be taken under consideration. Common knowledge is connected with the non-thematized anonymous inclusion of the ideological terminology into scientific discourse. (shrink)

In the Soviet scientific literature of 1920‒30 the concept of probability was holly debated. The frequency concept which was proposed by R. von Mises became popular among Soviet physicists belonging to the L.I. Mandelstam community. Landau and Lifshitz were also close to this concept in their famous course of theoretical physics. A.Khinchin, a mathematician who cooperated with Kolmogorov, opposed to the frequency conception. In this paper we try to demonstrate that the frequency position was connected with the anthropomorphous approach to (...) physics, whereas Khinchin’s positions implied the criticism of anthropomorphism and put forward the ideal of objective knowledge. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 8, Page 15-17, August 2012.

(2011). Life and Death Choices in Neonatal Care: Applying Shared Decision-Making Focused on Parental Values. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 35-36.

There has been a great deal of philosophical discussion about using people, using people intentionally, using people as a means to some end, and using people merely as a means to some end. In this paper, I defend the following claim about using people: NOT ALWAYS WRONG: using people—even merely as a means—is not always morally objectionable. Having defended that claim, I suggest that the following claim is also correct: NO ONE FEATURE: when it is morally objectionable to use people, (...) this is for many different kinds of reasons—there is no one wrong-making feature that every morally objectionable using has in common. After discussing these claims, I use them to present and motivate what I call the “precaution” theory of norms against using people. I conclude by considering a few cases from the criminal law context—cases that are naturally described as using people—to assess the moral appropriateness of this kind of use in these cases, and to demonstrate how the theory applies to the real world. (shrink)

BackgroundThe emphasis on ethics and professionalism in medical education continues to increase. Indeed, in the United States the ACGME will require residency programs to include professionalism training in all curricula by 2007. Most courses focus on cases generated by the course instructors rather than on cases generated by the trainees. To date, however, there has been no assessment of the utility of these two case discussion formats. In order to determine the utility of instructor-generated cases (IGCs) versus resident-generated cases (RGCs) (...) in ethics and professionalism training, the author developed an innovative course that included both case formats. The IGCs were landmark cases and cases from the experience of the course instructors, while the RGCs were selected by the residents themselves. Residents were then surveyed to assess the strengths and weaknesses of each format.ResultsOf twenty-two second and third year residents, fourteen completed surveys (response rate 64%). Residents were nearly evenly split in preferring RGCs (38%), IGCs (31%), or not preferring one to the other (31%). 29% stated that they learn more from the RGCs, 21% stated that they learn more from the IGCs, and 50% stated that they did not find a difference in their learning based on format. In general, residents surveyed prefer a mix of formats. Residents tended to find the RGCs more relevant and interesting, and felt the IGCs were necessary to ensure adequate breadth of cases and concepts.ConclusionBased on our relatively small sample at a single institution, we believe that educators should consider incorporating both instructor-generated and resident-generated cases in their ethics and professionalism curricula, and should evaluate the utility of such a model at their own institution. Further work is needed to illuminate other potential improvements in ethics and professionalism education. (shrink)

In the paper, a detailed analysis of some new logical aspects of Cantor’s diagonal proof of the uncountability of continuum is presented. For the first time, strict formal, axiomatic, and algorithmic definitions of the notions of potential and actual infinities are presented. It is shown that the actualization of infinite sets and sequences used in Cantor’s proof is a necessary, but hidden, condition of the proof. The explication of the necessary condition and its factual usage within the framework of Cantor’s (...) proof makes, Cantor’s proof invalid. It’s shown that traditional Cantor’s proof has a second necessary, but hidden as well, condition which is teleological by its nature, i.e., is not mathematical. The explication of the second necessary condition makes Cantor’s statement on the uncountability of continuum unprovable from the point of view of classical logic.One of the most dramatic facts in history of science is connected just with the notion of actual infinity and consists in the following. On the one hand, Aristotle, Berkeley, Locke, Descartes, Spinoza, Gauss, Kant, Cauchy, Kronecker, Hermite, Poincaré, Bair, Borel, Brouwer, Quine, Wittgenstein, Weyl, Luzin, and a lot of other outstanding creators of classical logic and classical mathematics, during millenniums, stated categorically and insistently warned about that the actual infinity is a self-contradictory notion and its usage in mathematics is inadmissible (e.g., according to Poincare, “There is no actual infinity. - Cantorians forgot that and fell into contradictions. Later generations will regard Mengenlehre (set theory) as a disease from which one has recovered”). On the other hand, a lot of outstanding scientists of the XX c.c., such as Hilbert, Church, Turing, Gödel, etc., and modern axiomatic set theory as a whole ignored this (intuitive though) opinion of genii and accepted Cantor’s “transfinite paradise”, based on the actual infinity. In the paper some logical, philosophical, and psychological aspects of this historical “favorable opposition” are analyzed, and the fact that the scientific intuition of genii has won the historical battle against the mytho-’logic’ of Cantor’s transfinite ‘paradise’ is explained and logically justified. (shrink)

The advent of functional imaging has reinforced the attempts to define dreaming as a sleep state-dependent phenomenon. PET scans revealed major differences between nonREM sleep and REM sleep. However, because dreaming occurs throughout sleep, the common features of the two sleep states, rather than the differences, could help define the prerequisite for the occurrence of dreams. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Solms; Revonsuo; Vertes & Eastman].

This paper takes on several distinct but related tasks. First, I present and discuss what I will call the “Ignorance Thesis,” which states that whenever an agent acts from ignorance, whether factual or moral, she is culpable for the act only if she is culpable for the ignorance from which she acts. Second, I offer a counterexample to the Ignorance Thesis, an example that applies most directly to the part I call the “Moral Ignorance Thesis.” Third, I argue for a (...) principle—Don’t Know, Don’t Kill—that supports the view that the purported counterexample actually is a counterexample. Finally, I suggest that my arguments in this direction can supply a novel sort of argument against many instances of killing and eating certain sorts of animals. (shrink)

The present study investigated whether individual differences between psychologists in thinking styles are associated with accuracy in diagnostic classification. We asked novice and experienced clinicians to classify two clinical cases of clients with two co-occurring psychological disorders. No significant difference in diagnostic accuracy was found between the two groups, but when combining the data from novices and experienced psychologists accuracy was found to be negatively associated with certain decision making strategies and with a higher self-assessed ability and preference for a (...) rational thinking style. Our results underscore the idea that it might be fruitful to look for explanations of differences in the accuracy of diagnostic judgments in individual differences between psychologists (such as in thinking styles or decision making strategies used), rather than in experience level. (shrink)

Some RNases possess preferential cytotoxicity against malignant cells. The best known of these RNases, onconase, was isolated from frog oocytes and is in clinical trials as anticancer therapy. Here we propose an alternative platform for anticancer therapy based on T1 RNases of microbial origin, in particular binase from Bacillus intermedius and RNase Sa from Streptomyces aureofaciens. We discuss their advantages and the most promising directions of research for their potential clinical applications. BioEssays 30:781–790, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.